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This paper expands the micro-foundations of the traditional greed and grievance non-cooperative
model of civil conflict. First, we allow for greed and grievance to be orthogonal, so that they may
affect each other rather than being exogenous. Second, we allow for the reaction curves of both
parties in non-cooperative games to be substitutes and not inevitably complementary, so a peaceful
strategy from a group may be followed by a belligerent upsurge from the other. Third, we also allow
for Diaspora transfers to rebel groups, thus generating a trade-off between the gains associated with
peace and war among rebels. Fourth, we expand external aid in the form of fungible financing of
government transfers ‘buying’ peace by allowing for mechanisms that induce behavioural change
towards peace. These extensions provide a better understanding of conflict persistence, the con-
sequences of competing international aid and sub-optimal sanctions provision (“cheap talk”) by the
international community.
Keywords: Civil war; social contract; aid for peace.
1. Introduction
As with Tolstoy’s unhappy families, each conflict is different in its own way: international
wars, revolutionary civil wars, secessionist civil wars, colonial independence conflicts,
separatist domestic terrorism, international terrorism, narco-guerrillas, state violence,
revolutions and genocide may expectedly have specific causes, levels of belligerence,
dynamics and persistence. The economics literature, however, has developed a narrower
theoretical standard set-up that analyses civil conflict. For example, in Grossman (1991),
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a government and rebel group maximise their expected utility from states of war and peace.
The government party has access to revenues and royalties, but is threatened by the
excluded rebel group, which may violently overthrow it. As an extension, the government
may use the fiscal system to transfer resources to rebels to “buy” peace and an external
third party may contribute resources and/or set incentives for the local parties to commit to
peace. Recently, Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) argue that the dichotomy between greed
(appropriation of rents, see Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004)) and grievance (deep-rooted
injustices, as expounded by Gurr, 1970 and later by Stewart, 2000) in this standard model
to explain the origin of conflict, should shift into a balance in which both co-exist. Some
studies reject the inequality-grievance hypothesis (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Fearon
and Laitin, 2003); others stress it (Stewart, 2000; Østby, 2008).
But what has not yet been analytically explored is an endogenous relation between greed
and grievance. Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) argue that either or both greed and grie-
vance may explain the onset of conflict or its duration; neither, however, is sufficient in
explaining the ultimate cause of conflict, something which may be attributed to the failure of
the mechanisms that peacefully resolve differences (the social contract), see also Addison and
Murshed (2001). This is also related to state capacity. Besley and Persson (2008) argue that
external wars may promote the development of state capacity on behalf of a common interest
externally threatened. Instead, prospects of internal conflict may de-incentivise a government
from investing in state capacity. Another recent development, as in Murshed and Verwimp
(2008), is the study of the impacts that external third parties, whomay regard peace as a global
public good, have in ensuring peace commitments between local factions via financial flows
(aid, debt relief) and incentive mechanisms (military deployment, sanctions).
This paper expands the standard model of a civil conflict — defined as a breach of a
social contract between local groups — in three directions: (i) greed and grievance are no
longer orthogonal but instead, may also be endogenous; (ii) the war/peace strategies of
each local party are not inevitably complementary but may also be substitutes, that is,
groups may adopt opposing strategies; (iii) the external third party is not exclusively made
up of well-intended pro-peace brokers but also by diasporas unwilling to support a peace
deal that is not credible. We also examine external mediation to change the incentive
structure of the belligerents so that their interaction becomes more contractual and non-
belligerent. By extending the standard model in this way, we add to traditional results on
exogenous greed and grievance. International aid in buying peace may not be effective after
all, given that diasporas’ transfers may reverse the peace incentives created by international
aid. Also, rebels may react belligerently to non-credible “peaceful” actions by the gov-
ernment. Well-intended interventions — Nordic conditionality rather than strategic aid as
typically provided by the US, UK or France, for example — may bring about a world-wide
public good in the form of peace, but typically at sub-optimal levels, if the costs of
achieving peace are too high and/or are borne exclusively by donor taxpayers.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section lays out the theoretical model.
Section 3 explores the main findings of the model and its implications for striking a viable
peace deal among belligerent factions in the face of external players own interests.
Section 4 concludes.
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2. A Model of Social Contract and Civil Conflict
As indicated above, civil conflict is defined as a breach of a social contract between local
groups within a standard set up in which government and rebels maximise their expected
utility from states of war and peace. The government party has access to revenues and
royalties, but is threatened by the excluded rebel group, which may violently overthrow the
government. Either strategy (war and peace) has costs for each player, whose strategy is
also motivated by greed and grievances. Note that the roles formulated below for the
government and the rebels can be reversed. In what follows, we set out the model (related
to Addison, Le Billon and Murshed, 2002), starting with the expected utility of the gov-
ernment side (G), which is given by:
2.1. The government side
G ¼ ða, eÞGP þ ð1 ÞðÞGC  CðaÞ ð1Þ
Where GP and GC denote utilities or pay-offs in peace and conflict respectively, weighted
by the probabilities of the two states, peace () and war (1 ). The pay-offs are
endogenous in the sense that the probabilities of the two states depend on a strategic action
(a) undertaken by the government, which is defined in a manner such that it increases the
chances of peace. The strategic action parameter itself will depend on a number of vari-
ables described below.
The net income of the government (YGÞ is defined in Equation (2), and includes
fungible aid. Note also that the government’s income is greater during peacetime. The
parameter, a, is the strategic choice variable of the government.
GP ¼ YG  pFG  T
GC ¼ YG  cFG
c > p > 0, cþ p ¼ 1 for two states of nature:
ð2Þ
T is the “transfer” made by the government to the rebels in the state of relative peace and
depends on government income. This can take a variety of forms including broad-based
social and development expenditure extended to the rebels (El Salvador, Colombia), power
sharing (as recently as in Kenya), and the inclusion of the otherwise excluded group in
government jobs (Rwanda and Burundi) and state contracts. On these points, see
Azam (2001). FG denotes military expenditure, this is clearly greater in wartime than
during peace, hence c > p. The parameter, a, is the strategic choice variable of the gov-
ernment and determines quantities of F and T chosen. This is described below and depends
on the grand objective function of the state. Note that even the peaceful outcome is a state
of armed peace, as a minimum credible deterrent is required by the state, and up to now
choices between fighting or conflict and peace are not all-or-nothing (0, 1) choices.
The probabilities of the two states are not related to a Tullock type rent-seeking contest
(Hirshleifer, 1995, for example).1 This is because the low-intensity conflict is not a war of
1This is where the chances of winning the prize (winner takes all) is related to the outlays (fighting effort) made by each
antagonist relative to the total effort of all contenders.
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attrition. The rebels cannot expect to oust the government solely via a military victory and
vice versa, which is characteristic of virtually all civil wars at present. Nor does the
government have a Weberian monopoly over violence. We are concerned with a continuum
of possible states of peace or war. Above all, this is not a contest with only one winner,
who captures the entire prize but a contest over shares. Furthermore, and more generally, in
asymmetric conflicts that we witness nowadays, the fighting technology adopted by each
side can be different.
In fact, the strategic actions of the two players are mixed strategies, involving a trade-off
between peaceful-belligerent behaviour. This is because one can mitigate one’s opponent
either by accommodating them peacefully, or by fighting them, or a combination of both
(carrot and stick). On the government side, its strategic action, (aÞ, depends on this trade-
off between peace and war, specifically on the trade-off between T and FG.
a ¼ bGC þ ð1 bÞGP ð3Þ
Here b refers to the relative welfare from war and 1 b the relative social utility of peace,
the minus sign before conflict is to relate it to social welfare in terms of peace. The
parameter b is left exogenous at this stage. Simplifying the expression above into:
a ¼ bFG þ ð1 bÞT ð4Þ
The above expression is justified by the fact that conflict involves fighting (negative sign
before the first term on the right hand side of Equation (4)), and peace implies transfers to
the rebels (a positive sign before the second term on the right-hand side of Equation (4)),
and therefore we can substitute these terms into the government’s strategic variable which
is a proxy for its welfare function. Totally differentiating the expression in (4) we obtain:
da ¼ bdFG þ ð1 bÞdT ð5Þ
A more benevolent and developmental state may prefer making transfers to rebels to
fighting them. In that case b < 1=2; if b > 1=2 fighting is preferred to transfers; in the limit
if b ¼ 0 then there is only peace, and b ¼ 1 implies only war, b ¼ 1=2 implies indiffer-
ence. Observe that, when b ! 0, we have a social contract from the government’s point of
view, and when b ! 1, we have war, in the intermediate region we have an imperfect social
contract. Thus, it is possible for the state to be both benevolent or developmental and
repressive at the same time, and various degrees of benevolence (repression) are possible as
b declines (rises).
The parameter b may also be regarded as a measure of grievance or war-related greed.
Grievance can be viewed as historical mistrust, as in the case of Hutus versus Tutsis in
Rwanda and Burundi; greed may be construed as the value of staying in power, and not
making concessions to disaffected groups (the excluded) after the discovery of oil as it was
the case in Chad or Sudan. Note that we have modelled the simultaneous existence of both
greed and grievance, based on our earlier argument that at any point in time, once conflict
has progressed, greed and grievance can and do function simultaneously. A similar
argument may be made about the rebels.
In Equation (1), C is the cost function of undertaking the action, a, which increases the
probability of peace, , a > 0, but aa < 0, implying diminishing returns to this type of
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action in terms of its input into the probability of peace, as shown, for example, in the
Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. This is costly because of direct political costs of
accommodating enemies to some hawkish supporters of the government. Both Ca > 0 and
Caa > 0, as marginal cost is continually increasing. This cost function may also incor-
porate psychological costs of making peace to historical foes.
2.2. The rebel side
Turning to the rebel or excluded group, its expected utility (RÞ is given by:
R ¼ ða, eÞRP þ ð1 ÞðÞRC  EðeÞ ð6Þ
where
RP ¼ Y R  pFR þ ð1 δÞT
RC ¼ Y R þ B cFR þ δS ð7Þ
In Equations (6) and (7) a number of variables are similar to what has been described
above, except that they have a superscript (R) to identify the rebel group. The pay-offs are
endogenous in the sense that the probabilities of the two states depend on a strategic action
(eÞ undertaken by the rebels, which as with the government, raises the probability of peace.
The strategic action parameter itself will depend on a number of variables described below.
The income of the rebel group in the state of war is supplemented by contributions from
sympathetic citizens’ abroad (SÞ, as in Armenia, Sri Lanka or Eritrea; as well as exports (BÞ
of narcotics (Colombia) and/or natural resources such as alluvial or blood diamonds
(Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone). This is admittedly a simplified characterization of dia-
sporas but it is still a useful addition to challenge the plain assumption of international
donors transferring resources to “buy” peace exclusively. Analogously, diasporas may
transfer resources to “buy” war, through money, arms trafficking or lobbying for inter-
national support. Interestingly, they also bear historical grievances as do the rebels, but they
do not benefit from government’s transfers aimed at striking peace. We capture the role of
diasporas through the parameter, δ, which is a measure of the credibility of the government
transfer vis-à-vis the transfer from diasporas abroad who are sympathetic to their com-
patriots but really want the rebels to fight the government. If δ ¼ 1, then the state’s
transfers are not credible to expatriate rebels, but the rebels have diasporas’ finance (S) to
use in a relatively more conflictive state. So, the inverse of δ measures state credibility and
legitimacy to its supporters outside the country. Put differently, δ relates the valuation that
rebels grant to transfers received, both from the government and diasporas. For the sake of
analytical simplicity, we have made transfers (T) from the government occur only in peace-
time, and diasporas’ finance (S), or the export of narcotics and lootable resources (B)
happen only in the state of belligerence. Furthermore, we have made both T and S vary
inversely, so the greater the credibility of transfers from the state, the lesser are contri-
butions from sympathetic kinsmen abroad, and this depends on δ. This reflects the fact that
during peace, the contributions of sympathetic diasporas are considerably diminished, as is
rebel control over the sources of lootable revenues. Note, δ is at this stage exogenous; in a
sense it captures state credibility (including legitimacy, the strength of the social contract
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etc.), and its inverse captures the legitimacy of diasporas.2 In principle, with more state
legitimacy, the rebels’ utility function should increase with peace and decline with conflict,
other things being equal.
E is the cost of effort, e, which increases the probability of peace, . Also, e > 0, but
ee < 0, Ee > 0, and Eee > 0. Turning to its determination, adopting a method similar to
the government side, with a role for a trade-off between war and peace and the fact that it is
implicitly the social welfare function, e can be expressed as:
e ¼ kðFR þ BÞ þ ð1 kÞT  kδS ð8Þ
where k is the relative weight given to war. The term (1 k) is the relative benefit of peace.
Note that in war time, the rebels have access to some war time booty. Totally differentiating
the above:
de ¼ kdFR  kdBþ ð1 kÞdT  δkdS ð9Þ
If δ ¼ 0, the state is perfectly credible to diasporas, and totally incredible when δ ¼ 1. In
practice, it is a measure of diasporas’ grievance that affects the valuation of transfers to
rebels: the higher that grievance, the higher the valuation by rebels of transfers accruing from
diasporas vis-à-vis government transfers should be expected. Note that there are intermediate
possibilities. If k ¼ 1=2, the rebels are indifferent to war or peace; preferring peace when
k < 1=2, war if k > 1=2; only war if k ¼ 1, and only peace when k ¼ 0. So k is a measure of
grievance of the domestic rebels or war-time greed.3 Note that the peaceful effort of the rebels
depends on both the subjective preferences of domestic rebels, as well as the attitudes of
sympathetic diasporas. Observe that the closer δ and k are to zero, the more proximate the
social contract outcome from the excluded group’s (potential rebels) point of view.
3. Solving the Model
3.1. Non-cooperative behaviour
Conflict (non cooperation) occurs because neither side can cooperate or enter into a social
contract due to the presence of historical grievances, low levels of transfers to the rebel
group, imperfectly credible transfers to the rebel group or because the returns to peace
relative to war are insufficient. In the model, the strategies adopted by the two-sides (a and eÞ
in a Cournot-Nash non cooperative one-shot game are endogenous. This in turn depends on
disposable income, transfers and fighting intensities hinging on the nature of the government
as well as pure grievances on the rebel side.
Each side will maximise its own utility function with respect to its own choice variable.
For the government, it implies maximising utility in Equation (1), with respect to a (holding
2More precisely, δ is exogenous to current decisions of both factions and captures in a sense the strength of historical
grievance that depends little on what the opposing side is currently doing (either increasing T or FG, for instance). It is a
parameter invariant to increasing well-intended international aid or the establishment of healing truth commissions, or the
signing of weak peace agreements.
3As in the case of δ, which measures the historical grievance of diasporas, k may be deemed as the historical grievance and/or
greediness of the rebels.
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the arguments in the a function as given and constant):
∂G
∂a
¼ a½GPðÞ  GCðÞ  Ca ¼ 0 ð10Þ
Rebels maximise Equation (4) with respect to e; again holding the arguments in the
e function constant):
∂R
∂e
¼ e½RPðÞ  RCðÞ  Ee ¼ 0 ð11Þ
Equations (10) and (11) form the basis of the reaction functions for both sides, obtained by
totally differentiating them with respect to a and e. Thus:
de
da=RG
¼ Caa þ aa½G
CðÞ  GPðÞ
ae½GPðÞ  GCðÞ
‚
• 0 if ae
‚
• 0 ð12Þ
and
de
da=RR
¼ ae½R
PðÞ  RCðÞ
Eee þ ee½RCðÞ  RPðÞ
‚
• 0 if ae
‚
• 0 ð13Þ
Note that ae ¼ ea by symmetry.
The reaction functions are positively sloped if ae > 0, implying that the two strategies
are complements (Figure 1). This is the standard assumption in the literature on conflict,
see for example Hirshleifer (1995). It means that increases in fighting or peaceful efforts by
one side are matched in the same direction by the other side. In our model, however, we
allow for the possibility that ae < 0, the choice variables are strategic substitutes, and the
reaction functions could slope downwards (Figure 2). In fact, this is also the result of δ
being exogenous to current efforts (being instead entrenched in historical events).
This can only occur because the strategy space is defined in terms of peace. Thus if one
side behaves more peacefully, it increases the utility of both parties, and the other side may
free-ride on this action by actually reducing their own action. Note that the free-riding does
not necessarily lead to a rise in the equilibrium level of conflict, as the side raising its
e
a
R0G
C
R1G
R0R
R1
R
A
B
Figure 1. Strategic complements.
On the Micro-Foundations of Contract vs Conflict with Implications for International Peace-Making 17
efforts may compensate more than proportionately for the group lowering their action.
Recall that we are concerned with relative states of war and peace. Thus the two strategies
can become substitutes the closer society is to complete peace, or the lower the state of
belligerency. The higher the intensity of war or deeper the grievances, the greater the
likelihood of the two strategies being complements (Figure 1), as is conventional in the
literature.
3.2. International aid, diaspora ﬁnance, greed and grievance
Since most bilateral and multilateral aid donors are limited to giving assistance to the state
or government, we will confine our attention to aid to the government for the moment
(although it is often the case that donors can reach out to rebel groups via intermediaries
such as NGOs or their own secret services). Aid to the government augments its income
(YGÞ. First, in terms of our model, if donors can engineer a situation that makes foreign aid
conditional on peace or transfers to the rebel group, the RG curve rightwards in Figure 1
along the rebel reaction function when the government receives aid in a state of peace only,
and there is a rise in T to the rebels; we move from point A to B in Figure 1 with increased
peaceful activity by both sides. In terms of Equation (5), this means that donors are dealing
with a state that derives greater welfare from transfers to the rebels when its income in
Equation (1) rises, rather than trying to emasculate them through military force (b ! 0).
In Figure 2, a similar gift causes the government’s reaction function to move upwards,
along the rebel reaction function, and we move from A to B. The government raises
peaceful action, a, but the rebels’ have lowered, e, as the strategies are substitutes in this
case. They will free-ride on the government, and we cannot be sure that the overall
equilibrium levels of peace have risen or fallen. This is a peculiar result that can take place
in some specific contexts: a former authoritarian regime accustomed to the use of force
then turning into an electoral or pseudo-democracy, with an opposition that deems
e
a
R0G
B
R1G
R0R
C
A
R1R
Figure 2. Strategic substitutes.
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democratization efforts a sign of weakness and reacts to these efforts by resorting to force
and violence. This may be the case in Kenya’s increased violence following recent elec-
tions, or violent strife in Haiti around election time. We can also find this substitutability of
efforts in terrorist ceasefires. Peace talks resulted in splintered IRA groups that increased
the belligerence of the conflict in Northern Ireland. In Spain, truces or “peace talks” are
believed to be periods used by ETA terrorists to re-group.
Thus, when aid or international support is given in this situation (with strategic sub-
stitutes), policies have to be adopted to influence rebel behaviour as well. Overall, such aid
conditionality, which is often desired by Nordic donors, is notoriously difficult to achieve.
The recipient may accept aid and then renege on its commitment to work towards peace.
As aid is fungible (unconditional) the recipient may transfer all or part of these resources to
its military effort. If we examine Equation (5) above, taking a derivative with respect to YG,
we will notice that transfers to the rebels could rise with an increase in government income
for values of b < 1=2. Furthermore, unconditional aid to the government may result in an
increase in both transfers to the rebels, as well as military efforts to suppress them, if
b ¼ 1=2 in Equation (5). If the donor, like in the case of the USA’s aid to Colombia (or
arguably in Iraq, Afghanistan or in the past to South Vietnam), gives mainly military
assistance (FGÞ, then the government may only increase fighting intensity, particularly if
b ! 1, in which case both the state and its external supporter prefer military solutions. In
terms of Figures 1 and 2, the movements are from point B to A. The upshot of the analysis
above is that we can have two types of aid donors, with one category more committed to
peaceful solutions to another nation’s civil wars relative to others and the latter more
interested in seeing its ideological foes defeated. Even the former type of donor is more
likely to be constrained in its intervention.
In the case of the rebels receiving increased diasporas finance, S (or ideologically
motivated assistance from a superpower during the cold war),4 reduced credibility of the
state’s transfers (increases in δ or k, heightened grievances), increases in greed (due to illicit
substance or gemstone rents, rise in BÞ causes its reaction functions to move down along
the government’s reaction function (see Equations (7) and (9)), and we move from point A
to C in both Figures 1 and 2 with more conflict in the case of Figure 1 (less a and eÞ. But
in the case of Figure 2, when the strategies are substitutes, the government side’s peaceful
actions will increase, but the overall effect on war and peace will still be ambiguous.
3.3. Mechanism design
So far we only considered the weak manipulation of the belligerents’ pay-offs by external
powers, who may be interested in either ending or perpetuating the conflict, or the struggle
by one side or another. To go one step further, we may consider mechanism design or the
introduction of innovations to the game and how the exogenous strategic behaviour of
belligerents can be endogenised or changed by interested parties outside of the conflict.
Neighbouring countries, aid donors and the great powers often interfere in a conflict or
4Such as the Western backed assistance to rebels in the Angolan and Mozambique civil wars who were initially aided via
South Africa.
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sometimes even mediate between warring factions. We will confine our attention to the
more altruistic (or Nordic type) donor who wants to establish peace. We will try to
demonstratewhy, despite the best of intentions, well-meaning donors cannot commit enough
resources to establish peace in distant lands, which if very costly, cannot be justified to their
domestic taxpayers.
We begin by looking at a hypothetical situation where a mythical global agency is able
to conjure the joint maximisation of both the government’s and rebel’s welfare. Let us call
this social welfare function, SW, which is the sum of Equations (1) and (6), the expected
utilities of the government and the rebels. Maximisation with respect to a and e respect-
ively would lead to:
abGPðÞ  GCðÞ þ RPðÞ  RCðÞc ¼ Ca ð14Þ
and
ebGPðÞ  GCðÞ þ RPðÞ  RCðÞc ¼ Ee ð15Þ
In this type of cooperative behaviour, the total social marginal benefits have been equated
to social marginal costs, leading to greater (cooperative) levels of peaceful behaviour
(a and e), when compared to the levels in the non-cooperative equilibrium in Equations
(10) and (11). This can be argued to be nearer the peaceful social contract, associated with
some form of power sharing or legitimate election of the governing party. But, how can this
hypothetical case outlined above, be achieved in practice? Consider the following policy
innovation or mechanism design in Equations (4) and (8) involving an intervention M,
which affects behavioural parameters:
a ¼ bðMÞFG þ ð1 bðMÞÞT ð16Þ
and
e ¼ kðMÞðFR þ BÞ þ ð1 kðMÞÞT  δkðMÞS ð17Þ
Where M is a carrot-cum-stick package to the government, domestic rebels and diasporas
to affect the behavioural parameters in their welfare functions. One can think of M as a
combination of aid and military sanctions that keep the peace and induce cooperation and
power sharing among erstwhile belligerents, as was successfully done in Kosovo and
Bosnia. We can also think of M as a combination of international isolation or limited
recognition with a simultaneous provision of technical cooperation and specific aid relief
as in North Korea or Palestine or military support as in Taiwan.
Totally differentiating the above two equations with respect to M:
da
dM
¼ b1dFG  b1dT > 0
b1 < 0 if Mðt þ 1Þ > 0; b1 > 0 if Mðt þ 1Þ < 0
ð18Þ
de
dM
¼ k1ðdFR þ dBþ dT þ δdSÞ  δ1kdS
k1, δ1 < 0 if Mðt þ 1Þ > 0; k1, δ1 > 0 if Mðt þ 1Þ < 0
ð19Þ
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In other words, the aid-cum-sanctions package (MÞ will have the desired effect on the
behavioural parameters of the belligerents (b, k and δ), and increase equilibrium levels of
peaceful effort (a and eÞ towards a social contract, if M is large enough (a necessary
condition which we assume fulfilled), and expected to last into the future at time (t þ 1).
This latter feature captures the credibility of the commitment by the donor to building peace
and the social contract. Otherwise, it will be perceived as cheap talk, and the signs of the
partial derivatives in Equations (18) and (19) acquire opposite signs and belligerents (or
spoiler groups) go back to war; see Murshed and Verwimp (2008).
Typically the policies considered above, M, will involve costs to outside powers and
agencies, as it is they who initiate them. We now consider the benefits of sanctions to
outside sponsors. It also describes situations where the finance and production of the
sanction, M, is not carried out by the same party. The separation of finance and enforce-
ment of peace deals is not uncommon. Often the financiers of peace treaties, especially the
aid component, are donors, such as Norway and Finland, without a direct security interest
in the conflict zone. An organisation like the African Union, through the armed forces of its
member states, may actually enforce a peace deal, whereas the funding and logistical
support for the operation may be provided by Western donors like the European Union, as
practiced in Darfur at the time of writing of this paper. Even UN peacekeeping mandates
are carried out by the military forces of member states who are paid for their efforts in this
regard. The idea here is that the sponsor or financier of peacekeeping derives some utility
from peace in other parts of the world due to security considerations (terrorism, refugee
influxes), humanitarian considerations or because promoting peace enhances the sponsor’s
international prestige. But how much is the external sponsor of the peace willing to pay,
and how far are they willing to go in this respect?
In many ways, the sponsor or financier of the sanction can be regarded as the principal,
and the implementer of the sanction the agent (either the government or rebels or some UN
agency or African Union), in a principal-agent framework of the type considered
by Laffont (2005). Let the utility function (V) of the external sponsor (principal) be:
V ¼ DðMÞ MQðMÞ  ð1þ λÞu,…,M 0 > 0, M 00 < 0, λ < 1 ð20Þ
Here D represents the benefits from the sanction in deterring the onset of war to the
external sponsor; QðMÞ is the inverse demand function for sanctions given its price or cost
which is paid to the agent, Q; u represents the transfer made to the agent to carry out the
task; λ captures the cost of distortionary taxation needed to finance the transfer. There are
diminishing returns to the benefits of the sanction, which means that as expenditure is
increased, the utility for each additional amount starts to decline.
From the standpoint of the agent (who could directly be the government or some foreign
agency such as the African Union), let us postulate a utility function, H:
H ¼ uþMQðMÞ  ðh xÞM  F  f ðxÞ,…, f 0 > 0, f 00 > 0 ð21Þ
On the right-hand side of Equation (21) we have the transfer to the agent from the prin-
cipal, u, the revenue from the sanction, MQ(MÞ, F represents a fixed cost of sanctions
production, the production of the sanction (MÞ depends on the qualitative type of the agent,
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h and the effort exercised by him (xÞ and f (xÞ represents the cost or disutility of effort to the
agent.5 Note that a higher value of h implies a more productive agent,6 his cost of pro-
ducing sanctions is correspondingly lower; greater effort, which is costly to the agent, also
elicits more output. Since the principal takes into account the agent’s objectives, we need to
solve for u in Equation (21) and substitute it into Equation (20), obtaining:
V ¼ DðMÞ þ λMQðMÞ  ð1þ λÞ½ðh xÞM þ F þ f ðxÞ  ð1þ λÞH ð22Þ
We add the utility of the agent, H, to the above function to obtain the grand utilitarian
welfare function, W ¼ V þ H:
W ¼ V þ H ¼ DðMÞ þ λMQðMÞ  ð1þ λÞ½ðh xÞM þ F þ f ðaÞ  λH ð23Þ
Maximising the above with respect to M:
D 0ðM *Þ þ λ½Q 0ðM *ÞQ* þ QðM *Þ ¼ ð1þ λÞðh x*Þ ð24Þ
In the above, asterisks (*) indicate optimal values. Equation (24) implies that the world
marginal utility of sanctions production is equated to its world marginal cost. From
Equation (24), the lower the marginal utility of sanctions to the sponsor D 0ðMÞ, the more
expensive the aid-cum-military sanctions package is in terms of “price”, Q 0ðMÞ; the greater
the shadow cost of the distortionary tax, λ, that has to be levied to finance it; and the greater
the effort levels (xÞ needed to produce a unit of sanction, the lower the optimal level of
sanction chosen. This relates to the “cheap talk” result above, from Equations (18) and
(19). If the optimal level of sanctions and aid produced are low in Equation (24), then the
peacekeeping force’s sanction is cheap talk or ineffective, as Mðt þ 1Þ < 0 in the future;
the sanction and aid will wither away in the future, and this is also expected to happen by
the various belligerents to the conflict. This is likely to happen if the conflict is in a distant
land, which lowers both the marginal utility of the sanctions-aid package and raises the cost
of doing so because of the endemic poverty in the country in question, as well as logistical
difficulties. In a sense, this is a reflection of a public good with externalities not captured by
donors: the benefits of peace, political stability and the absence of terrorism go to geo-
graphical regions or the entire world while the costs are borne by far-away tax payers. The
result is a sub-optimal level of sanctions production. One may argue that there is just not
enough will in the West to finance security in far away war torn places, in contrast to
problems at their back door, say in the former Yugoslavia, which are considerably more
menacing. There, benefits from peace-making were more directly “consumed” by Western
taxpayers.
4. Conclusions
This paper expands the micro-foundations of conflict generation and persistence within
the traditional set up of greed and grievances governing government and rebel relations.
5This effort (xÞ is different from a and e, when the agent is acting as a sub-contractor to the donor.
6 If it is the domestic government, a low b type; if the rebels, a low k type; if diasporas, a low δ type.
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First, we allow for substitutive (in addition to complementary) reactions by each party in a
non-cooperative Cournot-Nash game. As a result, rebels may respond to pro-peace moves
from a government by increasing belligerence. This may explain protracted conflicts even
when peace-making is attempted periodically. Second, we also allow for diasporas’
transfers to rebel groups. Diasporas are subject to similar historical grievances as domestic
rebel groups but they do not benefit from government’s peace transfers. Interestingly, those
transfers now introduce a trade-off in the gains associated with peace and war faced by
rebels. This may also explain why conflicts may persist over time even when resources are
mobilised to compensate for domestic rebels’ grievances. Third, we further characterise
international interventions into two types: direct (and often fungible) resources to gov-
ernments to buy peace in the form of money, development assistance, power sharing or
inclusion measures; as well as mechanisms that induce behavioural change towards peace,
such as conditional aid, sanctions, military peace-keeping. These mechanisms may be
altruistic as those from Nordic states or more strategic as support by the USA, for instance.
Within a principal-agent set up, we explore several reasons why such mechanisms may be
ineffective in practice and how sanctions, military deployment, political or technical
cooperation act as public goods with externalities in the form of world-wide benefits with
costs borne specifically by Western taxpayers.
These extensions have two important implications for conflict resolution. First and
foremost, although transfers from governments to rebels may resolve or mitigate the issue
of greed, grievance may still persist if efforts to increase viability, credibility, and enfor-
ceability are not in place. The lesson for the international community is that pouring
resources, aid or debt-relief and ensuring their distribution to rebels may not work on its
own in altering strategic behaviour. Other things must occur for civil conflicts to cease.
Governments may also opt out from traditionally repressive policies and adopt a more
developmental approach. Rebels — and diasporas — need to make concessions. Second,
conflict resolution must be aligned with the donor’s interests, otherwise external aid will
not be sufficient or effective. Donor’s interest also explains the form of aid selected to assist
other countries immersed in conflict. Pakistan’s military governments have been aided by
the USA in the 1950s (cold war anti-Soviet military pacts), 1980s (Afghanistan) and now
(post 9–11) in spite of mainly choosing repression against its population instead of
development, sowing the seeds of future conflict. In contrast, in ex-conflict zones such as
the Balkans, aid per-capita is very high and those regions are policed by high quality, well-
motivated and adequately mandated Western and NATO forces. At the same time, lip-
service is paid to the need to end civil wars in Africa, and weak and ineffectual forces are
despatched there from inside and outside the continent, usually under the aegis of virtually
impotent Security Council sanctioned UN mandates. Underlying the lack of a willingness
by international donors to pay is the fact that peace, stability and progress are global public
goods whose costs are borne only by donors’ taxpayers. The externalities of the global
peace public good result in a sub-optimal provision of peace-making efforts by the
international community, with provision concentrated where global benefits are perceived
to accrue more readily to Western taxpayers.
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